Abstract : This paper deals with an optiiiial stopping gaine in dylzanlic fuzzy systems with fuzzy rewards. We give a, fuzzy rela,tionavl equation, whose unique solution is the optinla1 discounted fuzzy reward. This paper estiinates discounted fuzzy rewards, by introducing a fuzzy expectation with a density given by fuzzy goals. We show the existence of the value of the game, by giving a ininiinax theorein for fuzzy expected values.
and S n + l ( y ) : =~u p m i n { S n (~) , @ (~, y ) ) , y~E , n = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . .
.
(1.1)
x E E For simplicity, we define a iiiap ij : F(E) H F(E) a,s follows. For any 5 E .F(E),
Then, (1.1) is represeiited by Firstly, we describe fuzzy nunibers in order to define fuzzy rewards. Let R be the set of all real numbers. For a fuzzy set ci on R aiid a E [ O , l ] , tlie a-cut ci, is defined by where cl deiiotes tlie closure of a set (for tlie details, refer to Nov&k [lo] and Zadeh [17] ).
Then, a fuzzy set i on R is called a fuzzy nuinber if ci satisfies the following coilditions ( N l ) -(N3)
( N l ) The a-cut ci, is a bouilded closed subinterval of R for a E [O,l] . We represent it by (N2) cia/ = ci, for a > 0.
(N3) ci is normal, i.e., S U p z E~ G(z) = 1.
We denote the set of all fuzzy numbers by Fn(R), and deilote the set of all bouilded closed subintervals of R by C(R).
An addition and a scalar n~ultiplication for ilon~legative fuzzy liuinbers are defined as follows (for example, see [6] ) : For ci, b E Fn(R+) and X 2 0, the addition ci + G of ci and b and tlie scalar multiplication X i of X and ci axe fuzzy numbers given by
We define a partial order 5 on Fn(R+) : Let 6, GE F n ( R + ) . 
for m l , rn2 E N U {oo}, wliere P is tlie possibility ineasure gelierated by tlie density i j and f di' deiiotes Sugeno iiitegrill (Ill, 131). In tliis paper, we consider the followi~ig optiinal stoppiiig ga,iiie. Problem 1.1. Maximize (1.6) with respect to player 1's stopping times m1 and lniiliinize (1.6) with respect to player 2's stopping times m2.
The fuzzy expectatioil inlplies the degree of satisfactioil of discou~lted fuzzy rewards for player 1, and the fuzzy goal jj ( z ) means a kind of utility fuilctioil for fuzzy payoffs z in (1.6) (see Sakawa and Nishizaki [12] ).
From (1.4), we can clefine a,n optimal fuzzy reward with respect to the fuzzy max order )-as follows : G(9, *, m2) := V G(9, ml, m2) for 9 E .F(E),
where V and A mean the supremuin and the infiinurn with respect to the fuzzy lnax order t respectively. Then, we note that G(s", *, m2), 6(S, m', *) E F ( E : R) for finite ml, m2.
firtller we put
(1.10)
Then, it is trivial thak Z1(9) 5 ,G*(S) 5 6*(9) 5 ~~ ( 9 ) (1.11) since, by taking m2 = 0 in (1.9) and m1 = 0 in (1.10) , we have
Optimal fuzzy rewards
In this section, we give a fuzzy relational equation to characterize the optimal fuzzy rewards G, and G*.
if C a n > -m and Cb, < oo; Proof. Tliey are trivial.
Proof. Tliey are trivial, by applyiiig Leiniiia 2.1 for their a-cuts.
Next, we introduce a distance between fuzzy-nuiliber-va,lued functions on F(E). We denote the Hausdorff metric on C(R) by 6 (see [7] ):
Then, we define a metric on F(E : R) as follows :
Further, we define a norin I/ . /I on F(E : R) by
where we put I{,) E F ( E : R) by Ijo1(5) := 0 (the crisp number zero) for 5 E +(E).
Then the followiilg elerneiltaory results call be easily checked (c.f. [4] ). We obtain the following theorems for the optimal fuzzy rewa.rds in (1.9) and (1 .lo). 
6(Z) = F ' (~) V {?(,i')+pG(ij(Z))} A ~~(~$ 1 for SE F ( E ) .
Proof. Let 
f (. !?) + /36,(@(5))} A c2(9) for 9 E F ( E ) .
Therefore 6, satisfies (2.3). Siiliilarly, we can check that 6" is a solution of (2.3) .
If G, 6 E F ( E : R) are solutioils of (2.2), then by Lemnla 2.4 we have
So we obtain F = 6 since 0 < /? < 1. Thus (2.3) has a unique solution. Therefore we get ii, = ii*, and it is a uniclue solutioii of (2.3).
A Minrnax Theorem
I11 this section, we discuss the fuzzy expectation of fuzzy rewards. From iiow on, we fix ail initial fuzzy state s" E F ( E ) . Defiiie a level a* by Then, fro111 the defiilitioil (N2) of fuzzy numbers, we have We prove that a* equals to the optimal expected va,lue. Proof. Let a satisfy 0 5 a < &(G(S)). By Lemina 3.1(i), we have Therefore a 5 a * . Thus, we get a* 2 E (~( 5 ) ) .
Next, let a < a * . Theii we liave By Leinina 3.l(ii), a 5 E(G(S)). Thus we get a* 5 E(i? (5)). Therefore we obtain (3.3).
We obtain the following iniiii~iax tl~eorem regrading fuzzy expected values. Since i j is nondecreasing, by the definition of the fuzzy expectations E(i?(S)) and E(G(s, m, *)),
Tl~eorem 3.2. It holds that
we get E ) ) ( ( m * ) ) . for all m 2 0.
If a* = 0, then (3.6) is trivial from (3.7) and Theorem 3.1. We assume a* > 0. Let t be an arbitrary real number such tliat 0 < t < a*. Let a satisfy a* -t < a < a * . Together with (3.7) and Theorein 3.1, we obtain (3.6) . This iiliplies the left equality in (3.5 ).
Next we prove that E(ii(5, ml, *)) = i f ( ( s m nlin ( ( S m m2)) for finite m1 ) 0. If ,!?(ii(S, ml, *)) = 1, then (3.8) is trivial. We assuine &(ii(S, ml, *)) < 1. Let t be an arbitrary real nuiilber s11c11 thak 0 < t < 1 -,!?(ii(S, ml, *)). Let a satisfy E ( i i (~, ml, *)) < n < E(ii(S, ml, *)) + t. From the definition of ii(S, ml, *), there exists m' such that Then we have G(S, ml, m' ): = C(S, ml, *): < ij,.
By Lenllna 3.1 (i),
Since 6 is arbitrary, we get min &'(ii(S, ml, m)) 5 E(ii(S, rn' , *)).
nz:OLnzLml+l
Together with (3.9) and Theorem 3.1, we obta.in (3.8) . Fro111 (3.6) and (3.8) , we get the left equalities in (3.4) sad (3.5). We can also check the right equalities in (3.4) and (3.5) similarly. Thus we get this theorem. 
Similarly, we obtain sup fi(ii(9, ml, ?)
(4.14)
m1 >0
Thus, (4.13) and (4.14) imply (4.12). Therefore, r1 is player 1's optimal stopping time and r2 is player 2's optimal stopping time for Problem 1.1. The proof is completed.
A numerical example
We consider a nuinerical exainple with a one-dimensional st ate space. Take the st ate Therefore, we can calculate fuzzy rewards G(S, ml, m2) (ml, rn2 2 0). Froni Fig. 5 .1, in this example we find that the opti~nal fuzzy expected value is given by at an optimal payoff x* = 1.49033.
Then, players' optimal stopping time are r' = r2 = 0. 
